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Abstract 
Private enforcement follow-on actions may discourage cartel members from applying to 
leniency. To prevent the undermining of this public enforcement tool, it is necessary to find a 
proper articulation between damages actions and leniency programmes. This paper 
investigates, in light of the Damages Directive on actions for damages for infringements of 
competition law, what can be expected from the new framework for the disclosure of 
evidence and, particularly, from the application of Article’s 6(4) proportionality test to decide 
the disclosure of leniency documets. It starts off by analysing the state of the art before 2015 
and continues to assess the novelties in disclosure of evidence brought by the Directive. It will 
evaluate the changes on access to leniency material under Portuguese Law, by examining the 
current Portuguese competition law and the Portuguese Private Damages Act, and the effect it 
can have in this Member State’s legal system. This paper further examines the principles 
which should be considered by national judges when striking the proportionality test, 
comparing European fundamental rights with the principles found in rulings from the Court of 
Justice of the European Union. This contribution will result in a suggestion of some criteria to 
be considered by national civil courts when determining third party access to leniency 
documents. 





AG: Advocate General 
Charter: Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
Commission: European Commission 
CJEU: Court of Justice of the European Union 
Damages Directive: Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European 
Union (OJ L 349, 5.12.2014) 
ECHR: European Convention on Human Rights 
ECN: European Competition Network 
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Introduction: the Articulation between Public and Private Enforcement 
 
1. Preliminary Remarks 
The articulation between public and private enforcement has been prominently discussed. 
When considered separately, both tools envisage the effective enforcement of competition 
law. According to the Commission’s Green Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC 
antitrust rules, both policies 
«(…) are part of a common enforcement system and serve the same aims: to deter 
anti-competitive practices forbidden by antitrust law and to protect firms and 
consumers from these practices and any damages caused by them. Private as well as 
public enforcement of antitrust law is an important tool to create and sustain a 
competitive economy»1. 
One as much as the other, individually considered, aim at increasing compliance with 
competition rules. Yet, it is undeniable that each policy has different immediate objectives: 
while public enforcement has the goal of preventing violations and ending on-going practices 
through deterrence and punishment, private enforcement deals with the consequences of 
occurred violations, aiming at, through damages actions, obtaining rightful compensation for 
those who were injured by anti-competitive practices. 
It must be recognized, though, that the compensation of cartel victims also has a deterrent 
effect, as undertakings may be discouraged from forming or maintaining such an infringement 
if there is a risk of civil liability. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) was 
clear when, in Courage, it held that: 
«(…) the existence of such a right [right to damages] strengthens the working of the 
Community competition rules and discourages agreements or practices, which are 
frequently covert, which are liable to restrict or distort competition»2. 
As both public and private enforcement serve the same purpose, one could think that they 
could easily go hand in hand. This idea can, however, be discouraged when we realise that the 
risk of increasing follow-on damages actions may undermine the effectiveness of cartel 
                                                          
1 Commission’s Green Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 19 December 2005, 
COM(2005) 672, 19.12.2005, point 1.1. 
2 Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd. v. Bernard Crehan, 20 September 2001 [ECLI:EU:C:2001:465], para. 27. 
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leniency programmes, one of the most important public enforcement detection and 
investigation tools. 
Under leniency programmes, undertakings confess their participation in an alleged cartel in 
return for either immunity from a fine or its reduction. As cartels are secret by nature, 
concealment and destruction of cartel-related evidence is common. Consequently, the 
cooperation of undertakings with the Commission and the National Competition Authorities 
(NCAs) is an important instrument in the detection and deterrence of these infringements. The 
Commission itself has declared that the leniency programme is the most effective tool at its 
disposal for the detection of secret cartels3. 
Accordingly, and because a leniency application does not protect the applicant from the civil 
law consequences of his participation in a cartel, it is understandable how these applications 
must be protected so that infringers are not discouraged from applying to this programme. 
This is even more important when we consider that the Damages Directive4 provides that a 
final decision of a National Competition Authority (NCA) is deemed to be irrefutably 
established for the purposes of an action for damages brought before a national court5. This 
means that leniency applicants are, by principle, more vulnerable to damages actions than the 
remaining co-infringers – at least so far as they will not refute the NCA’s final decision and, 
thus, will most likely be the first to be sued before the courts.  
However, and at the same time, it should not be ignored that, even if the infringement is 
established, injured parties still have to meet all other civil liability requirements established 
by law: the existence of material injury and the causal link between the infringement and the 
alleged injury.  
It happens that the relationship between cartel participants and their victims is characterised 
by an information asymmetry, as relevant information is predominantly secret and, naturally, 
in the hands of the infringers. Consequently, and as emphasized by the recent judgements 
Pfleiderer6 and Donau Chemie7, and embraced by the recent Damages Directive, Member 
                                                          
3 Observations of the European Commission, pursuant to Article 15(3) of Regulation 1/2003, provided in respect 
of Claim No. HC08C03243 in the High Court of Justice Chancery Division, Royal Courts of Justice, National 
Grid, 03 November 2011, point 12. 
4 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the 
Member States and of the European Union (OJ L 349, 5.12.2014). 
5Article 9(1) Damages Directive. 
6 Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt, 14 June 2011 [ECLI:EU:C:2010:782]. 
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States can no longer blindly deny access to leniency information, in so far as it would result in 
making it virtually impossible for a third party to exercise his rights to claim damages8.  
It is undoubtable that access to self-incriminating material, would be an important source of 
evidence for claimants to, in case of follow-on damages actions, prove causation and quantify 
the damages that were suffered. However, it should be considered that allowing access to 
leniency material to cartel victims, «may discourage cartel participants from applying to 
leniency, which would significantly impede the discovery and punishment of cartels, which 
would in turn lead to a lower degree of compensation of cartel damage»9, leading us to a 
vicious circle. 
Taking the above, the discussion that follows shall focus on the articulation between public 
and private enforcement of competition law and on the confidentiality of leniency materials 
following the Damages Directive. In this paper, we will concentrate in displaying the issues 
involved in the following query: what can be expected from the new framework for the 
disclosure of evidence set out in the Damages Directive and, particularly, from the application 
of Article’s 6(4) proportionality test to decide the disclosure of leniency materials? 
 
2. The Question of Access to Leniency Documents in Private Litigation 
Leniency programmes start with a confession of the infringer, namely with the leniency 
statement, where he admits having been involved in a cartel. That statement is then coupled 
with other documents that provide valuable information regarding both the objective and the 
activities of the cartel and its length, usually detailing the products and markets that were 
envisaged, the co-infringers, and methods of contact and meeting amongst them. These latter 
documents usually exist before, and independently, from the leniency programme and are 
referred to as “pre-existing documents”. On the other hand, the self-incriminating statement 
that is exclusively drafted and submitted for the purposes of leniency is known as a 
“corporate statement”. These documents are voluntarily submitted by the leniency-applicant 
to the Commission or to the competent NCA, accordingly, and are kept in their internal file. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
7 Case C-536/11, Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v. Donau Chemie AG, 6 June 2013 [ECLI:EU:C:2013:366]. 
8 For further information on the right to an effective remedy of cartel victims see Courage Ltd. v. Bernard, (op. 
cit., nt. 2) and Cases C-295/04 to C.298/04, Manfredi and others, July 13, 2006 [ECLI:EU:C:2006:461]. 
9 CAUFFMAN, Caroline, (2011) The Interaction of Leniency Programmes and Actions for Damages, Maastricht 
Faculty of Law Working Paper No. 2011/34. Final version published as Cauffman, C., The Interrelationship 
between Leniency and Damages Actions, Competition Law Review, p. 183. 




Bearing in mind the different nature of the documents that are part of the leniency file and in 
order to better assess whether they should be disclosed, it is important to distinguish the three 
main interests to be considered: (i) the interests of the leniency applicants, (ii) the interests of 
the injured parties and (iii) the public interest of discouraging and punishing cartels.   
On the one hand, leniency applicants have a legitimate expectation that the information they 
have provided remains confidential, expecting that it is only used for the purpose it was given: 
establish an infringement, without being disclosed to the public. On the other hand, injured 
parties need the greater access to existing information, since only then can they properly 
exercise their rights.   
As for the latter interest, it is not so simple to ascertain. While it is important to maintain the 
attractiveness of leniency programmes, it is not possible to ignore the benefits that private 
enforcement brings to the effectiveness of competition rules by increasing the consequences 
of engaging in anti-competitive practices10-11. The question is what produces a higher 
deterrence effect: imposing fines or promoting the payment of civil liability compensations? 
Depending on the answer that the Commission and NCAs give to this question, different 
significance will be the given to the disclosure of leniency documents.  
Here is where the interplay between public and private enforcement becomes complex: if 
undertakings learn that the documents they bring to leniency programmes can be disclosed, 
their incentive to apply to leniency can be diminished. Although this does not mean that the 
infringement will continue – the cartel can still come to an end –, it is possible that it will 
never come to light. This phenomenon was analysed by LAURA GUTTUSO, who concluded 
that: 
«(…) broadly speaking, an increased probability of a court judgement ordering a 
defendant to pay private damages increases deterrence in the system and may lead to 
companies refraining from entering into collusive agreements in the first place. 
However, once a collusive agreement is firmly in existence, this increased probability 
of exposure to private damages may in actual effect strengthen the collusive 
                                                          
10 Commission’s Green Paper, point 2.7. (op. cit., nt. 1). 
11 Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (OJ C 298, 8.12.2006), para. 
6 and Recital 26 Damages Directive 2014/104/EU (op. cit., nt. 4). 
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agreement. Depending on the expected size of any possible damages award, this tend 
to reduce the attractiveness of defecting and co-operating with the authorities»12. 
Being true that leniency programmes bring heavy benefits to its applicants (as they either 
exempt or reduce the fine to be paid), if and when infringers must add to their calculations the 
increased likelihood of being targeted for private damages actions, that are based or grounded 
on the documents they brought to the leniency programme, the benefits of maintaining the 
cartel activity – or to simply leave quietly – may be greater than those of seeking leniency. In 
this regard, FREDERIK SILBYE conducted a study where he found that the bigger the potential 
damages coming from private claims, the less the likelihood of infringers applying to 
leniency13. 
FLORIAN WAGNER-VON PAP also agrees with the authors above, considering that: 
«Where private damages claims are added to the payoff matrix, the pareto-dominant 
equilibrium of continuing with the cartel instead of applying for leniency becomes 
relatively more attractive. The reason is that where one or both undertakings apply for 
leniency, they are nearly certain to be sued for damages. Where, however, both 
undertakings continue with the cartel (…), they have to pay damages only with the 
probability that their cartel is detected by means other than leniency applications, 
such as whistleblowers or investigations following tips from suppliers or customers of 
the cartel or sector-enquiries (…). (…) This means that from a theoretical perspective 
any private enforcement regime that does not privilege leniency applicants with 
regard to damages claims makes leniency programmes less attractive on the 
margin»14. 
Moreover, even where infringers apply to leniency or where cartels are detected by 
competition authorities, it can be expected that, if undertakings know that they can be 
compelled to disclose information in future litigation, cartelists will leave no paper-trail, or 
will leave it as little as possible. This leads us to the paradox mentioned earlier, which is that 
                                                          
12 GUTTUSO, Laura, (2014) The Enduring Question of Access to Leniency Materials in Private Proceedings: 
One Draft Directive and Several Court Rulings, Global Competition Litigation Review 2014 Vol 7 Issue 1, p. 
16. 
13 SILBYE, Frederik, A Note on Antitrust Damages and Leniency Programs, 2012, apud GUTUSSO, Laura, 
ibidem. 
14 WAGNER-VON PAPP, Florian, (2016) Access to Evidence and Leniency Materials, Chapter B: “Articles 6 
and 7: Balancing Private and Public Enforcement”, Section i: “The Tension between Private Enforcement and 
Leniency Programmes”. 
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the possibility of disclosure may create an incentive to destroy evidence and, hence, make it 
less available to the injured parties.   
All things considered, to achieve a proper balance between private enforcement and leniency 
programmes the Law can intervene, essentially, at two alternative levels: (i) by preventing 
and limiting the disclosure of leniency-related documents or (ii) by limiting or eliminating 
civil liability of leniency applicants.  
Before the Damages Directive – whose solution will be analysed further in Chapter II – and 
with the purpose of identifying solutions that would retain the attractiveness of leniency 
programmes, the Commission put forward three options that benefited the leniency applicant, 
namely: (a) the granting of a conditional rebate on any civil claim, (b) limiting the scope of 
the leniency applicant’s liability and (c) the exclusion of disclosure of the leniency application 
and of corporate statements15.  
 
a. Rebate on Damages Claim 
This option was designed on the Commission’s Green Paper16, following the proposal for an 
application of double damages in civil actions17, and consisted on a rebate for the leniency 
applicant in the form of a de-doubling of damages. The leniency applicant would be liable for 
single damages, whereas other cartel members would be jointly and severally liable for 
double damages. 
The Commission did not retain this option in its White Paper, nor has it been reflected in the 
Damages Directive, as it has not been shown that such as incentive is strictly necessary to 
maintain the attractiveness of the leniency programme. 
 
b. Limiting the Scope of Liability 
As a rule, colluding undertakings are liable for the entire damage caused by their 
anticompetitive agreements and the co-infringers are jointly and severally liable for the 
                                                          
15 Commission’s Green Paper, options 28-30 (op. cit., nt. 1) and Commission’s White Paper on damages actions 
for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2008) 165, 2.4.2008, section 2.9. 
16 Commission’s Green Paper, option 29 (op. cit., nt. 1) 
17 Idem, option 16. 
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damage. This means that a victim is entitled to claim the whole of the compensation from any 
member of the cartel.  
In order to benefit the leniency applicant, the Commission proposed, in its Green Paper, to 
limit the liability of the leniency applicant to the share of the damages corresponding to the 
applicant’s share in the cartelised market18. 
This option was reformulated in the White Paper, where the Commission put forward the 
recommendation of limiting the civil liability of the immunity recipient to claims by his direct 
and indirect contractual partners. In other words, the immunity recipient should not be held 
liable either for the damage suffered because of services or products purchased from another 
cartel member nor for the harm caused to those victims that have not bought, indirectly or 
directly, cartelized products from him19.  
This proposal was adopted in Article 11(4) of the Damages Directive, with the addition that 
immunity recipients shall also be jointly and severally liable to other injured parties where full 
compensation cannot be obtained from the other undertakings that were involved in the same 
infringement of competition law.  
 
c. Exclusion of Disclosure of Leniency Application and of Corporate Statements 
While the Green Paper proposed the exclusion of discoverability of the leniency application20, 
the White Paper restricted the exclusion to the discoverability of corporate statements. The 
latter option was included in the Damages Directive, where Article 6(6)(a) provides a total 
ban on the disclosure of leniency statements.  
 
Taking the question outlined above, this paper starts by visiting the available routes for 
injured parties to obtain access to leniency documents before the Damages Directive, 
analysing both Regulation (EC) no. 2019/2001 and Regulation (EC) no. 1/2003. Afterwards it 
will address the ground-breaking judgements of Pfleiderer and Donau Chemie and their 
contribution to the change of the European Union (EU) legal framework on private damages.  
                                                          
18 Idem, option 30. 
19 Commission’s White Paper, section 2.9. (op. cit., nt. 15). 
20 Commission’s Green Paper, option 28 (op. cit., nt. 1). 
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Thereafter the paper examines the changes brought by the Damages Directive, namely by its 
Articles 5 and 6, attempting to ascertain the choices that have been expressely made by the 
European legislator and how national courts should assess disclosure requests. The same 
chapter brings the discussion to Portugal, where it will review the Portuguese Private 
Damages Act and present some considerations on what can be expected on disclosure of 
leniency documents and competition law enforcement in this Member State.  
The final chapter dives into the proportionality test as envisaged by Article 5(3) and 6(4) 
Damages Directive, followed by an identification of the EU fundamental rights that should be 
considered in this balancing exercise, all in an attempt to find some criteria to be considered 
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I. Access to Leniency Documents Before the Damages Directive 
 
Despite the recent Damages Directive, that has provided some rules aimed at establishing a 
common approach to the issue of disclosure of evidence in private enforcement claims, it is 
our understanding that, in order to fully comprehend how the Directive should be applied – in 
particular the proportionality test envisaged in its Article 6(4) – it is both necessary and useful 
to learn from the past. Henceforth, this chapter will provide an overview of the state of the art 
on the disclosure of leniency documents before the Damages Directive, tracing the relevant 
EU Law interests that, should be transposed to the present day. 
We will start by analysing the two common routes that damage claimants can use to seek 
disclosure of cartel evidence: Regulation (EC) no. 1049/2001 and Regulation (EC) no. 
1/2003. Thereafter, special attention will be paid to the ground-breaking Pfleiderer and 
Donau Chemie rulings. 
 
1. Regulation (EC) no. 1049/200121 
The second subparagraph of Article 1 Treaty on European Union (TEU) enshrines the concept 
of openness, which can also be found in Article 15(1) Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) which provides that «(…) the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible». Following that general 
principle, Article 15(3) TFEU, together with Article 42 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (Charter), provide for the citizens’ right of access to documents of the 
European Institutions. Regulation (EC) no. 1049/2001, also known as the Transparency 
Regulation, implements this right22.  
 
Despite the general right to have access to the documents held by European institutions, 
Article 4 Transparency Regulation contains certain exceptions to the principle of transparency 
and openness. Concerning leniency documents, it is expected that the most common 
                                                          
21 Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001). 
22 On the applicability of the Transparency Regulation to leniency documents, see its Article 2(3): “This 
Regulation shall apply to all documents held by an institution, that is to say, documents drawn up or received by 
it and in its possession, in all areas of activity of the European Union”. 
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exceptions to be argued are those of Article 4(2), in particular: the protection of commercial 
interests23 and the protection of investigations24. However, because the exceptions derogate 
from the principle of the widest possible access to documents, they must be interpreted and 
applied strictly25.   
When examining the argument that disclosure would undermine the protection of commercial 
interests, the General Court (GC) has considered that in order to refuse access to documents 
on that ground, the Commission needs to verify not only whether the documents in question 
come within the scope of this exception but also whether it is reasonably foreseeable that its 
disclosure will specifically and actually – that is, not merely hypothetically – harm the interest 
protected, as well as verify whether there is no overriding public interest in disclosure26.  
This argument followed the reasoning of the Court of First Instance in VFK, where it was also 
considered that «the mere fact that a document concerns an interest protected by an exception 
[in this case, the protection of investigations] cannot justify the application of that exception 
(…)»27 and, hence, it was considered that «the examination which the institution must 
undertake in order to apply an exception must be carried out in a concrete manner and must 
be apparent from the reasons for the decision»28. 
As for what can be considered a legitimate commercial interest, the GC has specifically held 
that «the fact remains that the interest of a company which took part in a cartel in avoiding 
such actions cannot be regarded as a commercial interest and, in any event, does not 
constitute an interest deserving of protection».29 
                                                          
23 Article 4(2), first intend Transparency Regulation. 
24 Article 4(2), third intend Transparency Regulation. 
25 Joined Cases C-174/98 P and C-189/98 P, Netherlands and van der Wal v. Commission, 11 January 2000 
[ECLI:EU:C:2000:1], para. 27; and Case C-353/99 P, Council v. Hautala, 6 December 2001 
[ECLI:EU:C:2001:661], para. 25; Case C-64/05 P, Sweden v. Commission, 18 December 2007 
[ECLI:EU:C:2007:802], para. 66 . 
26 Case T-237/05, Éditions Odile Jacob v. Commission, 9 June 2010 [ECLI:EU:T:2010:224], para. 41, C-404/10 
P, Commission v. Éditions Odile Jacob, 28 June 2012 [ECLI:EU:C:2012:393], para. 116; Case T-111/07, 
Agrofert Holding v. Commission, 7 July 2010 [ECLI:EU:T:2010:285], para. 58, 101, 123, 141, Case C-477/10 P, 
Commission v. Agrofert Holding, 28 June 2012 [ECLI:EU:C:2012:394], para. 79. 
27 Case T-2/03, VFK v. Commission, 13 April 2005 [ECLI:EU:T:2005:125], para. 69. 
28 Ibidem. 
29 Case T-437/08, CDC Hydrogene Peroxide v. Commission, 15 December 2011 [ECLI:EU:T:2011:752], para. 
49. 
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On the other hand, the GC also ruled that, in its turn, a damages action would not constitute 
an overriding public interest in disclosure, but solely an individual and private one30. 
In what concerns the protection of investigations, the Commission has argued that the concept 
of investigations cannot be limited to the proceedings leading to a decision prohibiting the 
cartel but should be regarded as an integral part of the Commission’s task of public 
enforcement of competition law31. The GC, however, has consistently considered that the 
acceptance of such an interpretation would have the effect of excluding the whole of the 
Commission’s activity from the Transparency Regulation32, avoiding its application without 
any limit in time, to any document in a competition case merely by reference to a possible 
future adverse impact on the Commission’s leniency programme33. Hence, and on the 
contrary, the GC considered that «the investigation in a given case must be regarded as 
closed once the final decision is adopted, irrespective of whether that decision might 
subsequently be annulled by the courts (…)»34. This finding was, however, overruled by the 
CJEU, where it concluded that «investigations relating to a proceeding under Article 81 EC 
may be regarded as completed only when the decision adopted by the Commission in 
connection with that proceeding is final»35, that is, where no legal proceedings that might lead 
to the annulment of that decision are pending.  
As for general rules regarding the assessment of the request of access to the file, courts have 
considered that, as a matter of principle, the institutions must carry out a document-by-
document examination, undertaking an individual and concrete assessment of the content of 
the documents before refusing access to the file36.  
Despite this general rule, which was applied in EnBW’s first judgement37, the CJEU 
considered it differently and held that: 
«(…) for the purposes of the application of the exceptions provided for in the first and 
third indents of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, the Commission is entitled to 
                                                          
30 Case T-403/05, Mytravel v. Commission, 9 September 2008 [ECLI:EU:T:2008:316], para. 60-68. 
31 Case T-344/08, EnBW v. Commission, 22 May 2012 [ECLI:EU:T:2012:242], para. 124. 
32 Idem, para. 125. 
33 CDC, para. 70 (op. cit., nt. 29). 
34 VFK, para. 62 (op. cit., nt. 27). 
35 Case C-365/12 P, Commission v. EnBW, 27 February 2014 [ECLI:EU:C:2014:112], para. 99. 
36 EnBW, para. 28, (op. cit., nt. 31). 
37 Ibidem. 
The Confidentiality of Leniency Documents and its Articulation with Actions for Private Damages 
16 
 
presume, without carrying out a specific, individual examination of each of the 
documents in a file relating to a proceeding under Article 81 EC, that disclosure of 
such documents [documents provided in connection with an immunity or leniency 
application, including all documents submitted in connection with such application] 
will, in principle, undermine the protection of the commercial interests of the 
undertakings involved in such a proceeding and the protection of the purpose of the 
investigations relating to the proceeding».38 
In this regard and considering that the interest of a company in avoiding damages actions is 
not recognized as such, the CJEU explained that there are other commercial interests to bear 
in mind when deciding the disclosure of information, since the documents provided contain 
information on «the commercial strategies of the undertakings concerned, their sales figures, 
their market shares or their business relations»39. Notwithstanding this general presumption 
of confidentiality of leniency documents, the CJEU clarified that  
«(…) the general presumption referred to above does not rule out the possibility of 
demonstrating that a specific document disclosure of which has been requested is not 
covered by that presumption, or that there is an overriding public interest in 
disclosure of the document by virtue of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001».40 
Under the Court’s decision, it seems that the Commission can use a presumption that access 
by allegedly injured parties to documents submitted by a leniency applicant undermines 
legitimate interests. However, this presumption is rebuttable, which means that the allegedly 
injured party is given the right to prove that it must be given access to the requested 
documents.  
As for the relation between the Transparency Regulation and the new Directive, it should be 
noted that Article 6(2) Damages Directive explicitly provides that Article 6 is «without 
prejudice to the rules and practices on public access to documents under Regulation (EC) No. 
1049/2011». This means that, despite the entry into force of the Directive, claimants may 
request access to the documents of the EU Institutions and, if applicable, argue that there is an 
overriding public interest in the disclosure.  
                                                          
38 EnBW, para. 93 (op. cit, nt. 35). 
39 Idem, para. 79. 
40 Idem, para. 100. 
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On the other hand, it is interesting to note that the Commission has publicly stated that «much 
of the specific evidence required to corroborate claims for damages, e.g. as regards the exact 
quantification of individual damage suffered and the causal link to certain victims, will not 
have been investigated by the authority and therefore often not exist on its file»41. 
Consequently, the Commission considers that «rules on public access to documents normally 
do not constitute an appropriate legal basis for obtaining access to evidence for the purposes 
of pursuing private damages actions»42. For this reason, «litigants in civil proceedings for 
damages should not rely on that Regulation to obtain access to evidence for their damage 
claims»43.  
 
2. Regulation (EC) no. 1/200344 
Regulation (CE) no. 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty (current Articles 101 and 102 TFEU), made it compulsory for 
NCAs to apply the competition rules laid down in the EC Treaty where they apply national 
competition law to agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted 
practices within the meaning of Article 81(1) which may affect trade between Member States, 
or apply national competition law to any abuse prohibited by Article 8245. The aim of 
establishing this relationship between European and national competition laws was to ensure 
that the same rules were applied consistently throughout the EU. In addition, it was 
recognized that a close-cooperation needed to exist between the Commission and the NCAs to 
develop the enforcement powers of the latter. According to Recital 15 Regulation (CE) no. 
1/2003: 
«The Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States should form 
together a network of public authorities applying the Community competition rules in 
close cooperation». 
                                                          
41 Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC 
antitrust rules, 02 April 2008, SEC(2008) 404, 2.4.2008, para. 90. 
42 Idem, para. 90 and 104. 
43 Idem, footnote 50. 
44 Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L 1, 4.1.2003). 
45 Article 3 Regulation (CE) no. 1/2003. 
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It follows from the Regulation, that the Commission and the NCAs, together forming the then 
established European Commission Network (ECN), have the power to enforce Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU. To do so in close cooperation46, the Regulation foresees certain mechanisms 
of collaboration between, not only the Commission and the NCAs, but also the Commission 
and national courts, in accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation, established in 
Article 4(3) TEU. 
Pursuant to Article 15(1) of the Regulation, when applying Articles 101 and 102 national 
courts may ask the Commission «to transmit to them information in its possession or it 
opinion on questions concerning the application of the Community competition rules». This 
transmission of information is however limited by Article 339 TFEU. Indeed, and as 
CAROLINE CAUFFMAN explains: 
«(…) the duty of loyal cooperation requires the Commission to provide the national 
court with whatever information the latter asks for, even information covered by 
professional secrecy. However, in offering its co-operation to the national courts, the 
Commission may not in any circumstances undermine the guarantees laid down in 
Article 339 TFEU. Consequently, before transmitting information covered by 
professional secrecy to a national court, the Commission will remind the court of its 
obligation under Community law to uphold the rights which Article 339 TFEU confers 
on natural and legal persons and it will ask the court whether it can and will 
guarantee the protection of confidential information and business secret».47  
It follows from the Postbank48 judgement that if the national court cannot offer such a 
guarantee, the Commission may refuse to transmit the information covered by professional 
secrecy to the national court. Such refusal may also take place where, in exceptional 
circumstances, this is required by overriding reasons relating to the need to safeguard the 
interests of the Community or to avoid any interference with its functioning and 
independency, by jeopardizing the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to it49. 
                                                          
46 Recital 15 Regulation (CE) no. 1/2003. 
47 CAUFFMAN, Caroline, p. 191-192 (op. cit., nt. 9). 
48 Case T-353/94, Postbank NV v Commission, 18 September 1996 [ECLI:EU:T:1996:119], para. 93. 
49 Ibidem. 
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Another important confidentiality obligation imposed to the Commission, is the one laid out 
in Article 28(1) and which provides that such information «shall be used only for the purpose 
for which it was acquired».  
In what regards leniency information, the Commission has clearly sustained that «information 
voluntarily submitted by a leniency applicant will only be transmitted to another member of 
the network pursuant to Article 12 of the Council Regulation with the consent of the 
applicant»50. This rule also applies to «other information that has been obtained during or 
following an inspection or by means of or following any other fact-finding measures which, in 
each case, could not have been carried out except as a result of the leniency application»51. 
It is interesting to see how some Authors, such as ALBERTO SAAVEDRA, argue that this policy 
should only apply to the immunity applicant, and not in relation to the remaining cartelists, as 
he considers it necessary «in order not to endanger the accomplishment of the Commission’s 
task of enforcing competition law»52. As for the other leniency applicants, said author 
considers that «access to leniency documents provided in the context of the leniency 
programme should be left open, provided the Postbank guidelines on protection of 
confidential information are respected»53.  
One important guideline is the protection of business secrets that were generally defined by 
the CJEU as «information of which not only disclosure to the public but also mere 
transmission to a person other than the one that provided the information may seriously harm 
the latter's interests»54. In the Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission 
file, we can find a non-exhaustive list of information that qualifies as business secrets, and 
from which Member States can draw inspiration from, namely: technical and/or financial 
information relating to an undertaking's know-how, methods of assessing costs, production 
secrets and processes, supply sources, quantities produced and sold, market shares, customer 
and distributor lists, marketing plans, cost and price structure and sales strategy.55 
                                                          
50 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, 
para. 40. 
51 Ibidem. 
52 SAAVEDRA, Alberto, (2010) The Relationship between the Leniency Programme and Private Actions for 
Damages at EU Level, Revista de Concorrência e Regulação, Ano I, Número 4, outubro-dezembro 2010, p. 10. 
53 Ibidem. 
54 Postbank, para. 87 (op. cit., nt. 48). 
55 Commission Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of 
the EC Treaty, Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement and Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (OJ C 
325, 22.12.2005), para. 18. 




3. The Pfleiderer and Donau Chemie Rulings 
In the absence of harmonization on the access to NCA’s files, it is for each Member State to 
decide on this subject, based on their own national procedural rules. Notwithstanding, since 
the recognition of a right for compensation for infringements of EU competition law, the 
CJEU had to deal with this issue in two landmark cases: Pfleiderer56 and Donau Chemie57.  
 
3.1.The Pfleiderer Ruling 
Pfleiderer, a worldwide producer of laminate flooring, sought access to the file of the German 
Bundeskartellamt to prepare its follow-on action for overcharge from a cartel in the decor 
paper sector. Although Pfleiderer had expressly requested access to all the material in the file, 
including leniency applications voluntarily submitted, the Bundeskartellamt rejected the 
application and restricted access to the file by supplying a version from which confidential 
business information, internal documents and leniency material had been removed. Following 
this decision of partial rejection, Pfleiderer brought an action before the Local Court of Bonn. 
The national court, being inclined to adopt a decision where it would grant access to leniency 
documents – albeit with the protection of confidential business information, and recognizing 
that it might prove necessary to deny such access, pursuant to the effective enforcement of 
Articles 101 and 103 TFUE – stayed the proceedings and referred the following question to 
the CJEU for a preliminary ruling: 
«Are the provisions of Community competition law (…) to be interpreted as meaning 
that parties adversely affected by a cartel may not, for the purpose of bringing civil-
law claims, be given access to leniency applications or to information and documents 
voluntarily submitted in that connection by applicants for leniency which the national 
competition authority of a Member State has received, pursuant to a national leniency 
programme(…)?».58 
Looking at the Opinion of Advocate General (AG) MAZÁK, he started his assessment by 
stating that «the disclosure by a national competition authority of information voluntarily 
                                                          
56 Pfleiderer (op. cit, nt. 6). 
57 Donau Chemie (op. cit, nt. 7). 
58 Pfleiderer, para. 18 (op. cit, nt. 6). 
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communicated to it by members of a cartel pursuant to the authority’s leniency programme to 
an aggrieved third party could, in principle assist the latter in the preparation of an action for 
damages for infringement of Article 101 TFUE before the national courts in respect of 
alleged injury caused by the cartel»59. Hence, and in his view, NCAs «should not, in the 
absence of overriding legitimate reasons of public or private necessity, deny an allegedly 
injured party access to documents in its possession which could be produced in evidence in 
order to assist the latter in establishing a civil claim»60. With this mind-set, the AG 
proceeded with the distinction of those situations where an NCA can legitimately refuse to 
disclose information submitted by a leniency applicant.  
Firstly, the AG recognized that the disclosure by an NCA of all the information and 
documents submitted by a leniency applicant could seriously undermine both the 
attractiveness and effectiveness of that authority’s leniency programme, since leniency 
applicants would find themselves in a less favourable position than other cartel members in 
actions for civil damages, due to the self-incriminating statements and the evidence they had 
presented to the NCA61. Hence, the benefit of receiving immunity or fine reduction could be 
perceived as being outweighed by an increased risk of liability for damages, which could lead 
cartel members from abstaining from applying to leniency62. 
Taking the aforementioned into consideration, the AG thought it necessary to preserve as 
much as possible the attractiveness of leniency programmes, without unduly restricting a civil 
litigant’s right of access to information and ultimately an effective remedy63. To do so the 
AG, albeit limiting his examination to the question of access to information that does not 
contain any confidential business information or constitute internal documents64, 
distinguished in his Opinion between corporate statements and pre-existing documents.  
In what regards corporate statements, the AG found that their disclosure to civil litigants 
could substantially reduce the attractiveness and effectiveness of leniency programmes, and 
                                                          
59Opinion of Advocate General Mazák on Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer, 16 December 2010, 
[ECLI:EU:C:2010:782], para. 37. 
60 Ibidem. 
61 Idem, para. 28. 
62 Ibidem. 
63 Idem, para. 42. 
64 Idem, para. 21. 
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thus, undermine effective enforcement65. Although this restriction could hinder the injured 
party’s fundamental right to an effective remedy, the AG considered that this interference is 
justified by the legitimate aim of ensuring the effective enforcement of Article 101 and 
private interests in detecting and punishing cartels66.  
On the other hand, the AG considered that the denial of other pre-existing documents would 
run counter the fundamental rights of the injured parties, since such restriction is no longer 
justified by the protection of leniency programmes. This is so, he argues, because unlike 
corporate statements, pre-existing documents exist independently of the leniency procedure 
and, as such, could, at least in theory, be discovered elsewhere67. 
The CJEU, however, and despite recognizing that the effectiveness of leniency programmes 
could be compromised if documents relating to a leniency procedure were disclosed to private 
claimants68, reasoned his dictum under the assertion that it is settled case-law that any 
individual has the right to claim damages for loss caused to him by conduct which is liable to 
restrict or distort competition69. Consequently, instead of providing for a distinction between 
corporate statements and pre-existing documents, as proposed by the AG, the CJEU held that: 
«(…) the provisions of European Union law on cartels, and in particular Regulation 
No 1/2003, must be interpreted as not precluding a person who has been adversely 
affected by an infringement of European Union competition law and is seeking to 
obtain damages from being granted access to documents relating to a leniency 
procedure involving the perpetrator of that infringement. It is, however, for the courts 
and tribunals of the Member States, on the basis of their national law, to determine 
the conditions under which such access must be permitted or refused by weighing the 
interests protected by European Union law»70. 
First conclusion to be drawn from the Pfleiderer decision is that the CJEU left considerable 
leeway to national courts to decide whether to grant access to leniency material. Second is 
that national courts must conduct their weighing exercise in compliance with the principles of 
effectiveness and of equivalence, balancing the interests in favour of disclosure of 
                                                          
65 Idem, para. 44. 
66 Ibidem. 
67 Idem, para. 47. 
68 Pfleiderer, para. 26 (op. cit., nt. 6). 
69 Idem, para. 28. 
70 Idem, para. 32. 
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information and those in favour of its protection71. Third, and most important, is that while 
confirming the procedural autonomy of Member States, the Pfleiderer decision did not 
provide the national courts any guidance on how to draw the balance between such interests 
of access versus confidentiality of leniency materials.  
In this case, it is interesting to see how the Local Court of Bonn, following the Pfleiderer 
decision, considered that the attractiveness of leniency programmes would suffer considerably 
if potential applicants had to fear the disclosure of documents submitted voluntarily. Of 
particular interest is the statement made by ANDREAS MUNDT, the President of the 
Bundeskartellamt, who publicly said that: 
«Attractive leniency programmes are of the upmost importance for effective cartel 
prosecution. Leniency applicants often play a decisive role in detecting and proving 
cartel agreements. If we were not able to guarantee them confidentiality, they would 
think twice before cooperating with us».72 
 
3.2.The Donau Chemie Ruling 
In Donau Chemie, the trade association VDMT, following a decision of the 
Oberlandesgericht Wien imposing fines on Donau Chemie and others for infringement of 
Article 101 TFEU on the market in the wholesale distribution of printing chemicals, asked the 
national court for access to the file relating to the correspondent judicial proceedings, in order 
to gather evidence to use in follow-on damages actions. 
The Oberlandesgericht Wien considered that Austrian provisions protected information 
submitted in cartel cases in so far as such information could only be disclosed to third parties 
if all the parties consented to this waiver. As, moreover, parties could refuse to provide access 
without providing any reason, this blanket restriction did not leave any room for the 
consideration of the interests of that third party. Because the parties had not allowed access, 
the Austrian Court was bound not to allow third parties access to the file. 
However, and following Pfleiderer, the Oberlandesgericht Wien observed that the CJEU 
stated that national rules could not operate in such a way as to make it practically impossible 
or excessively difficult to obtain damages and that national courts should conduct a weighing 
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72 Press release of the Bundeskaltellamt, January 30, 2012, Decision of Local Court of Bonn strengthens leniency 
programme. 
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exercise. Taking this ruling, the Oberlandesgericht Wien wondered whether the Austrian 
provision was compatible with that interpretation of EU Law, given that it precluded national 
courts from any balancing exercise. As such, the Austrian Court referred a question to the 
CJEU, asking whether, in light of Pfleiderer, EU law precludes a national antitrust law which 
«(…) makes the grant of access to documents before the cartel court to third persons 
who are not parties to the proceedings, (…) subject, without exception, to the 
condition that all the parties to the proceedings must give their consent, and which 
does not allow the court to weigh on a case-by-case basis the interests protected by 
European Union law with a view to determining the conditions under which access to 
the file is to be permitted or refused?» 73. 
 
Once again, the CJEU reiterated that a balancing exercise must be performed to weigh, on the 
one hand, the interests of the third party who requests access to the file and, on the other hand, 
the right to protect the information contained in the leniency application74. The CJEU 
considered this to be necessary because «any rule that is rigid, either by providing for 
absolute refusal to grant access to the documents in question or for granting access to those 
documents as a matter of course, is liable to undermine the effective application of, inter alia, 
Article 101 TFEU and the rights that provision confers on individuals»75. Consequently, the 
CJEU concluded that national law must not be developed in such a way as to preclude any 
possibility for the national courts to conduct that weighing-up on a case by case basis76.  
As for how to conduct this balancing exercise, the CJEU put forward that «the argument that 
there is a risk that access to evidence contained in a file in competition proceedings which is 
necessary as a basis for those [damages] actions may undermine the effectiveness of a 
leniency programme in which those documents were disclosed to the competent competition 
authority cannot justify a refusal to grant access to that evidence»77. On the contrary, the 
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74 Idem, para. 30 and 34. 
75 Idem, para. 31. 
76 Idem, para. 35. 
77 Idem, para. 46. 
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refusal must be based on overriding reasons relating to the protection of the interests relied on 
and applicable to each document to which access is refused78.  
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II. The New Paradigm Brought by the Damages Directive 
 
It follows from both Pfleiderer and Donau Chemie that, when deciding whether to grant 
access to the file, in particular where it entails access to leniency material, national courts 
must conduct a balancing, case-by-case, exercise. These rulings lead to a situation of legal 
uncertainty in so far as cartel members, when applying to leniency, were unware if their 
documents would ever be made accessible to private litigants, especially because both 
judgements allowed a wide-margin of discretion to national courts. 
This uncertainty, however, has been mitigated with the adoption of the Damages Directive, 
intended to ensure a level playing field for undertakings operating in the internal market and 
to improve the conditions for consumers to exercise their rights79. Accordingly, the Directive 
reaffirms the right to compensation for harm caused by infringements of European 
competition law, while envisaging the effectiveness and consistency of the application of 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU throughout the Union. It follows from Recital 6 Damages 
Directive that consistency is particularly necessary in what regards the arrangements for 
access to documents held by NCAs, since these rules are particularly relevant in the proper 
coordination of public and private enforcement tools. The rules concerning the disclosure of 
evidence are arguably the most significant aspect of the Directive as they can have a 
substantial impact on the availability of evidence throughout the Member States. 
The most relevant provisions on disclosure are laid out in Articles 5 and 6 Damages Directive, 
from which it follows that the Directive places national courts in the position of gatekeepers. 
It is particularly interesting to see how the Directive, contrary to the 2013 Commission’s 
Proposal, no longer establishes any explicit duty on national courts to order disclosure80, but 
rather fosters the possibility for national courts to, under their control and discretion, order it. 
This possibility is the minimum standard that must be met by Member States, who are 
required to ensure that courts are able to order defendants, claimants or other third parties to 
disclose relevant evidence upon request.  
                                                          
79 Recital 9 Damages Directive . 
80Article 5(2) EC’s Proposal read that «Member States shall ensure that national courts order the disclosure», 
whereas the Directive’s Article 5(2) merely prescribes that «Member States shall ensure that national courts are 
able to order the disclosure». 
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As will be seen, and as so clearly identified by NUNO LOURENÇO81, these provisions have a 
two-fold goal: on one hand to address the issue of information asymmetry in damages actions 
where much of the evidence required by the claimant to prove his case can be in the 
possession of the defendant; and, on the other hand, to avoid reducing the incentives of 
undertakings to apply for leniency. 
 
1.  The Novelty of Article 6  
When the evidence which disclosure is sough is included in the file of a competition 
authority, Article 6 establishes special rules in view of finding a balance between the effective 
right to damages and the protection of effective public enforcement82.  
It is argued that, on the one end, an effective right to damages requires an extensive right to 
disclosure. On the other end, however, it is necessary to avoid any reduction in the 
effectiveness of public enforcement, namely leniency programmes. The double importance of 
these programmes is expressly recognized in Recital 26 Damages Directive, which reads that 
«(…) as many decisions of competition authorities in cartel cases are based on a leniency 
application, and damages actions in cartel cases usually follow on from those decisions, 
leniency programmes are also important for the effectiveness of actions for damages in cartel 
cases».  
In order to find that balance, Article 6 provides a distinction between different categories of 
evidence, finding those categories to be (i) absolutely banned from disclosure, (ii) temporarily 
banned from disclosure and (iii) subject to disclosure. 
Firstly, and bearing in mind the concern of protecting ongoing investigations83, Article 6(5) 
limits the disclosure of the documents therein identified to the moment where a competition 
authority has adopted a decision or has, otherwise, closed its proceedings. From our 
perspective, it’s particularly relevant to look at intends a and b of Article 6(5), where we can 
see that the «information that was prepared by a natural or legal person specifically for the 
proceedings of a competition authority» and the «information that the competition authority 
                                                          
81 LOURENÇO, Nuno Calaim, (2014) The European commission’s directive on antitrust damages actions, 
Revista de Concorrência e Regulação, Coimbra, a.5 n.18, abril-junho 2014, p. 71. 
82 Article 6(4), indent c) Damages Directive. 
83 See Chapter II, Section 1, above. 
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has drawn up and sent to the parties in the course of its proceedings» were included in this 
temporary blacklist.  
This special scheme was created by the legislator to relieve national judges from the concern 
of having to deal with requests for the disclosure of documents that were prepared or result 
from pending proceedings. Hence, and exemplifying, in case of a leniency application that has 
not yet resulted in a final decision from the NCA, the documents drafted by the leniency-
applicant, specifically for that proceeding, as well as the documents drawn up by the NCA for 
that purpose, cannot be disclosed. 
However, and contrary to what was held by the CJEU in EnBW84, the Directive clarifies that 
the exception of non-disclosure of those documents only applies until the proceedings of the 
NCA have been closed85, without having regard to whether the final decision might 
subsequently be annulled by the courts.  
Also contrary to the CJEU’s decisions, is the provision of Article 6(6), which provides a 
blacklist of documents that «cannot at any time» be ordered to be disclosed. As we have seen 
in both Pfleiderer and Donau Chemie86, the CJEU has considered that the right to claim 
damages cannot be precluded by blanket provisions that exclude certain documents from 
being brought to civil courts. To the contrary, the CJEU considered that national courts should 
be able to decide the disclosure of documents on a case by case basis. This reasoning was, 
however, set aside by the legislator who, following AG MAZÁK’s Opinion in Pfleiderer, 
considered that leniency statements should benefit from immunity from disclosure.  
To ensure that private damages claims have no detrimental effect on leniency programmes, 
the Damages Directive shelters leniency applicants from the fear that their leniency 
statements could be disclosed to claimants. According to Article 6(6) indent a), national 
courts may never order the disclosure of corporate leniency statements, which are defined in 
Article 2(16) as being: 
«an oral or written presentation voluntarily provided by, or on behalf of an 
undertaking or natural person to a competition authority or a record thereof, 
describing the knowledge of that undertaking or natural person of a cartel and 
describing its role therein, which presentation was drawn up specifically for 
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85 Article 6(5) Damages Directive. 
86 See Chapter II, Section 3, above. 
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submission to the competition authority with a view to obtaining immunity or a 
reduction of fines under a leniency programme, not including pre-existing 
information». 
Regarding the latter (pre-existing information), the prohibition on disclosure no longer 
applies. Instead, according to Article 6(9), national courts should be able, at any time, to order 
the disclosure of evidence that exists independently of the proceedings of a competition 
authority87.  
 
2. The Provisions of Article 5 
Article 6(1) states that it applies «in addition to Article 5», which provides the standard rules 
for disclosure, listing the conditions deemed necessary for such a request to be accepted by 
national courts (and which requirements cannot be derogated from88). 
The first condition set out in Article 5(1) for a disclosure order is that the request is 
accompanied by a reasoned justification89. Such justification should contain the «reasonably 
available facts and evidence sufficient to support the plausibility of its claim for damages»90. 
This wording is explained in the Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White 
Paper where it was illustrated that:  
«(…) a claimant may produce an infringement decision showing that the defendant 
participated in a cartel for product X covering territory Y and for period Z. He may 
also be able to produce purchase receipts for the same product from the defendant on 
the same territory and covering the period of the cartel. This makes his claim a 
plausible one and should be sufficient to allow the claimant to access the evidence 
necessary to meet the applicable standard of proof required for ultimately winning the 
case»91.  
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88 Article 5(8) Damages Directive. 
89 Article 5(1) Damages Directive. 
90 Ibidem. 
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It follows from this Article that national courts should be able to order the defendant or a third 
party the «disclosure of relevant evidence which lies in their control». 
The abovementioned Commission Staff Working Paper clarified that being relevant «means 
that the court would therefore have to assess whether the information or evidence to be 
disclosed is suitable to support the allegations in the initial fact pleading by the claimant»92. 
This indicates that relevance is to be assessed with regards to the claim or defence. Since the 
Directive provides no guidance as to what is to be considered relevant or how to determine 
whether disclosure is suitable to support the allegations, this criterion allows for a great 
margin of discretion. 
Although the necessary content of the reasoned justification of Article 5(1) is left unspecified, 
Article 5(2) adds that the request has to circumscribe the «specified items of evidence or 
relevant categories of evidence (…) as precisely and narrowly as possible». 
Looking at Recital 16 to the Directive, we can find some criteria as to what can be considered 
a “category of evidence”, as it explains that categories should be:  
«(…) identified by reference to common features of its constitutive elements such as 
the nature, object or content of the documents the disclosure of which is requested, the 
time during which they were drawn up, or other criteria, provided that the evidence 
falling within the category is relevant within the meaning of this Directive». 
 
The Recital further explains that «such categories should be defined as precisely and 
narrowly as possible on the basis of reasonably available facts». It seems to follow from this 
writing that only the categories of evidence should be specified as precisely and narrowly as 
possible. However, and at the same time, Recital 23 refers to «the requesting party’s duty to 
specify the items of evidence or the categories of evidence as precisely and narrowly as 
possible».  
Despite this arguable ambiguity, the wording is, as mentioned by FLORIAN WAGNER-VON 
PAP93, of little consequence. On the one hand, if one refers to a specific piece of evidence, 
then there is no need for any further precise and narrow circumscription. If, however, such 
piece of evidence is not sufficiently specified, it is still possible to examine whether it consists 
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The Confidentiality of Leniency Documents and its Articulation with Actions for Private Damages 
31 
 
on a sufficiently circumscribed category of evidence. Because every piece of evidence is part 
of a broader category, the final question – in case such piece of evidence is not precisely and 
narrowly specified – will be whether its category is well circumscribed.  
What happens, however, if the claimant possesses no or hardly any knowledge of facts that 
would allow a precise and narrow circumscription but, at the same time, it is not reasonably 
expected that he possesses such knowledge? 
One interpretation of the requirements of Article 5(2) is that such a request is bound to be 
rejected. This restrictive interpretation is justified by the concern against the so-called fishing-
expeditions, identified in Recital 23 Damages Directive as «non-specific or overly broad 
searches for information that is unlikely to be of relevance for the parties to the proceedings». 
As explained in that Recital, the generic disclosure of documents in the file of a competition 
authority relating to a certain case (including those documents submitted by a party in the 
context of a particular case), is to be considered disproportionate, as it would not be 
compatible with the requesting party’s duty to specify the items of evidence or the categories 
of evidence as precisely and narrowly as possible.  
Alternatively, if it is not reasonably expected that the claimant possesses knowledge of facts 
that would allow a precise and narrow circumscription, it could be argued that the request for 
disclosure is to be considered sufficient. As FLORIAN WAGNER-VON PAP explained94, «where 
nothing is reasonably possible, “as precise and narrow as possible”, is not precise and 
narrow at all». This interpretation was also followed in the Commission Staff Working Paper 
accompanying the White Paper where, referring to the specification of categories of evidence, 
it was explained that: 
«In the above example of a cartel relating to product X covering territory Y during 
period Z, the claimant in the system proposed above may well seek disclosure of 
documents about the price discussions between the cartelists for the clearly described 
product, period and territory to the extent that they may concern him. Disclosure 
could also be requested, for the specified product, period and territory, of facts to 
enable the claimant to determine what the pricing structure on the market would have 
been in the absence of the cartel» 95. 
 
                                                          
94 Ibidem. 
95 Commission Staff Working Paper, para. 106 (op. cit, nt. 41). 
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Consequently, a specification such as “price discussions between the cartelists” is deemed as 
sufficiently precise, while the specification “documents in the file of a competition authority 
relating to [a certain case]” is not96.  
Article 5(3) is – at least from our perspective and for the purposes of this work – the greater 
troublesome provision of the Directive, establishing that disclosure should be limited to what 
is proportionate. This provision and its consequences will be further analysed in Chapter III. 
Article 5(4) adds that Member States shall ensure that, when disclosing evidence containing 
confidential information, national courts shall have at their disposal effective measures to 
protect them. Some measures of protection are listed in Recital 18 to the Directive, which 
gives example as «the possibility of redacting sensitive passages in documents, conducting 
hearings in camera, restricting the persons allowed to see the evidence, and instructing 
experts to produce summaries of the information in an aggregated or otherwise non-
confidential form».  
A restriction on disclosure also exists for evidence covered by legal professional privilege97. 
Finally, Article 5(7) provides the right to be heard for the person from whom disclosure is 
being sought, before it is ordered.  
 
3. Access to Leniency Documents under the Portuguese Competition Act 
 
3.1.The Portuguese Competition Act before the Damages Directive 
 
Under Article 81 of the current Portuguese Competition Act98, it is classified as confidential 
not only leniency statements but also all the documents that are submitted for purposes of 
obtaining immunity or reduction of a fine.  
Access to these documents is only permitted under two circumstances:  
(i) To those concerned by an administrative proceeding (i.e. those concerned by a 
statement of objections of the Portuguese Competition Authority [PCA]), 
                                                          
96 Recital 23 Damages Directive. 
97 Article 5(6) Damages Directive. 
98 Law no. 19/2012, 8th May. 
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consultation of the statement and related documents is permitted, but any form of 
reproduction is expressly prohibited, unless otherwise authorized by the leniency 
applicant; 
(ii) To third parties, if the leniency applicant so consents.  
This legislative option leaves no room for doubts or dissenting interpretations on whether the 
documents submitted by a leniency applicant are at danger of being disclosed. On the 
contrary, the Portuguese legislator made it clear that the application for leniency, as well as all 
the documents and information submitted for those purposes, are to be considered 
confidential. This wording reveals a clear concern of the legislator in maintaining the secrecy 
of such documents, thus reinforcing legal certainty and maintaining both the attractiveness 
and effectiveness of leniency programmes.  
In other words, faced with the tension between public and private enforcement, the 
Portuguese legislator, recognizing that the success of public enforcement is largely dependent 
on the existence of leniency programmes, decided to stimulate and reward cooperation.  
However, considering that, the Damages Directive no longer admits blanket restrictions on 
the disclosure of leniency-related documents, this provision has inevitably been amended.  
 
3.2.The Portuguese Private Damages Act 
Following the Damages Directive, the rules on the disclosure of leniency material come in 
two forms: the absolute confidentiality of leniency statements99 and the possibility of, subject 
to a proportionality assessment, disclosure of leniency-related documents100. Accordingly, 
Member States whose legislation governs this matter differently are forced to readjust. As 
seen above, this is the case of Portugal as the current leniency regime grants a broader 
protection to leniency documents than that provided for in the Damages Directive. 
Therefore, and considering that the Portuguese Parliament has recently approved the 
transposition of the Damages Directive, we shall now analyse the proposal that was put 
forward by the Commissão de Economia, Inovação e Obras Públicas (hereinafter referred to 
as Private Damages Act) and approved last 20th of April. 
                                                          
99 Article 6(6)(a) Damages Directive. 
100 Recital 18 Damages Directive (pre-existing information); Article 6(5), intend a (information prepared 
specifically for the proceedings of a competition authority). 




3.2.1 Going beyond the Damages Directive 
Before addressing the rules on the disclosure of evidence, and because it might influence how 
private litigation will evolve in Portugal, it is interesting to analyse where the Portuguese 
legislator developed his creativity and see what options were exercised and where the Law 
goes beyond the minimum standard imposed by the Directive.   
First, although the Damages Directive only envisages the harmonization of rules regarding 
private enforcement actions resulting from infringements that, within the meaning of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU, affect trade between Member States101, the Portuguese Private Damages 
Act extended its scope to cover infringements that are purely domestic in nature102. This 
innovation was first proposed by the PCA who justified it in considering that «the Damages 
Directive’s main objectives are equally valid for damages actions resulting from purely 
domestic infringements (…) i.e., to ensure the victims’ right to compensation and, as a result, 
to reinforce the level of deterrence in Portugal»103. It was also considered that this was more 
suitable to ensure the overall coherence and certainty of the Portuguese legal system, as it 
guarantees equal treatment between infringers and between victims, regardless of the 
infringement’s potential to cause effects on trade (thus allowing an automatic compliance 
with the principles of effectiveness and equivalence, as envisaged in Article 4 Damages 
Directive). 
Second, the Private Damages Act goes beyond the minimum required by the Damages 
Directive in what concerns the binding effect of decisions of competition authorities and 
courts of other Member States. While the Directive explains that infringement decisions by 
competition authorities and review courts of other Member States are taken at least as prima 
facie evidence that the infringement occurred104, the Private Damages Act considers such 
decisions as rebuttable proof of the existence of the infringement, regarding the nature of the 
                                                          
101 Recital 10 Damages Directive clarified that «This Directive should not affect actions for damages in respect 
of infringements of national competition law which do not affect trade between Member States within the 
meaning of Article 101 or 102 TFEU». 
102 Article 1(1) and 2(l) Private Damages Act. 
103 MELÍCIAS, Maria João, (2016) The Art of Consistency Between Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement: 
Practical Challenges in Implementing the Damages Directive in Portugal, Revista de Concorrência e Regulação, 
Ano VII, Número 26, abril-junho 2016, p. 4. 
104 Article 9(2) Damages Directive. 
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infringement, as well as its material, personal, temporal and territorial scopes105. The reason 
underlying this option was the interest in avoiding the duplication of administrative costs and 
in preventing contradictory decisions, thus facilitating the victims’ right to compensation.  
Another novelty in relation to the Damages Directive are the rules on pre-trial discovery of 
evidence106. These rules anticipate the temporal scope when access to evidence can be 
obtained, enabling a potential plaintiff to ascertain whether to bring an action for damages.  
In particular, those who, pursuant to Articles 573 to 576107 of the Portuguese Civil Code, seek 
information or the submission of evidence may request the competent court to notify its 
holder, ordering the presentation of such information or evidence. This disclosure, albeit prior 
to a private damages action, follows the same rules and principles as the disclosure that is 
ordered during such a proceeding108.  
Additionally, some interim measures have been envisaged in so far as an alleged injured party 
may request the court to order immediate and effective provisional measures to preserve 
evidence of the infringement, when there are strong indications that is has taken place109. 
 
3.2.2 Access to Evidence 
In what regards access to evidence, Article 12 Portuguese Private Damages Act mimics the 
rules that are contained in Article 5 Damages Directive and Article 14 of that same Act 
replicates the rules contained in Article 6 Damages Directive. Article 12(7), however, takes a 
step further as, in what concerns the protection of confidential information110, and similarly to 
Recital 18 Damages Directive, it presents an illustrative set of measures that can be taken by 
national courts, namely: redaction of sensitive passages in documents; conduct hearings in 
camera; restrict the number of persons authorised to have access to the evidence, in particular 
by limiting access to the legal representatives of the parties or to experts subject to a 
confidentiality obligation; ask experts to provide summaries of the information.  
                                                          
105 Article 7(2) Private Damages Act. 
106 Article 13 Private Damages Act. 
107 Rules on the obligation to provide information or submit documents when the «holder of a certain right has a 
reasonable doubt about the existence or content of that right» (Article 573 of the Portuguese Civil Code). 
108 Articles 5 and 6 Damages Directive and correspondent Articles 12 and 14 Private Damages Act. 
109 Article 17 Private Damages Act. 
110 Article 5(4) Damages Directive. 
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As for the proportionality test contained in Article 14(3) Private Damages Act, the PCA 
added a further requirement as, following Article 6(11) of the Directive, it orders national 
courts to notify the PCA of any request for disclosure of evidence included in its files, to 
enable it to submit observations for the assessment of the proportionality of the request111. 
Besides the novelties mentioned above, the rules on disclosure of leniency material brought 
by the Directive lead to an amendment of Article 81 of the Portuguese Competition Act.  
However, and because the Directive and, hence, the Private Damages Act, only regulate the 
disclosure of leniency evidence for the purposes of private damages actions (while Article 81 
of the Portuguese Competition Act has a broader scope112), the legislator found that it was not 
necessary to fully amend Article 81. On the contrary, it opted to add a new paragraph where it 
conciliates the Competition Act with the Private Damages Act by referring the disclosure of 
leniency material under a private damages action to the rules contained in Article 14 of the 
Private Damages Act (the equivalent to Article 6 of the Damages Directive).  
 
3.3.Future Perspectives on Disclosure of Leniency Documents 
As the immunity or reduction of the fine does not preclude undertakings from their civil 
liability, and because there is a newly increased risk that self-incriminatory documents 
brought by leniency applicants may be disclosed in private enforcement actions, it is possible 
that a potential applicant may be deterred from applying to leniency. Even if he is not, it is 
more than likely that we will witness some changes on how leniency applications are made. 
The Portuguese procedure concerning the functioning of the national leniency programme is 
set out in the PCA’s Regulation no. 1/2013. According with this Regulation, a leniency 
application must contain precise and detailed information about the cartel113. Article 2(3) of 
said Regulation establishes, in turn, that the leniency applicant «shall submit, with the 
application, evidence relating to the alleged cartel that is in its possession or under its 
control, (…) enclosing a list». Although this wording seems to imply an obligation to enclose 
the actual documents, it does not seem to preclude an interpretation where leniency applicants 
                                                          
111 Article 15(2) Private Damages Act. 
112 Article 81 Portuguese Competition Act, under the heading “Confidential Information”, concerns the access to 
leniency material under any context. 
113 Including, inter alia, its objectives, activity, functioning, product or service at issue, geographic scope, length, 
as well as dates, places, content and participants of meetings concerning the cartel (Article 2(2) of PCA’s 
Regulation no. 1/2013). 
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simply submit the identification of the documents, providing its list, without attaching them to 
the application. On the contrary, applicants may, from this interpretation, simply identify the 
evidence that supports their application (by listing it) and make it available to consultation by 
the PCA on the applicants’ premises.  
By doing this, and albeit such documents are still subject to disclosure under the general rules 
provided in Article 5 Damages Directive and Article 12 Private Damages Act, there would be 
no disincentive in applying to leniency since the self-incriminating evidence would not be 
part of the PCA’s file. 
Hence, and considering the increased risk on disclosure, it is possible that leniency applicants 
will start resorting to this redirection of leniency evidence.  
Even if such interpretation is not possible and, consequently, leniency applicants must, or 
otherwise do, enclose evidence to the PCA’s file, it would be natural for applicants to choose 
the submitted evidence more carefully, providing only the minimum required to prove the 
infringement. In other words, it is not only possible but likely that infringers will be less 
diligent and exhaustive when submitting documents to the leniency programme, particularly 
in what regards evidence that can be used to quantify damages.  
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III. Striking the Balance: the Proportionality Test 
 
Despite the rules laid down in the Damages Directive and the guidance that is provided in its 
Articles 5 and 6, there is still a margin of discretion that is given to national courts when 
deciding whether to order the disclosure of certain evidence. The question is then, how wide 
is this margin and what interests and criteria can and/or should be considered by national 
judges in their assessment. 
 
1. The Proportionality Test as Envisaged by the Damages Directive 
Article 5(3) Damages Directive provides that the disclosure of evidence is limited to what is 
«proportionate». It is for the national judge in question to evaluate the claimant’s request by 
way of applying a proportionality test while considering «the legitimate interests of all parties 
and third parties concerned»114. The range of interests is largely open-ended, allowing a great 
leeway for national courts to apply different standards. Consequently, it is possible that 
national courts from either traditionally restrictive or liberal Member States will use this 
requirement to either deny or grant disclosure, respectively, by simply applying a different 
weigh on the interests involved. 
In any event, we should consider that the openness of the proportionality judgement is 
partially limited by the indents of Article 5(3), where the Directive indicates that national 
courts should consider (i) the extent to which the claim or defence is supported by available 
facts and evidence, (ii) the scope and cost of disclosure and (iii) whether the evidence at issue 
contains confidential information.  
Although the value of the damages claim is not explicitly indicated as a requirement to be 
taken into account, it is likely that it will still be considered as a factor when assessing 
whether the cost of disclosure is proportionate. As explained by FLORIAN WAGNER-VON PAP, 
proportionality requires considering the ratio: 
«(…) between the cost of disclosure and the marginal increase in expected value of the 
claim where disclosure is granted. (…) the marginal benefit of disclosure will usually 
be expressed in a percentage increase in the probability of succeeding with the claim 
                                                          
114 Article 5(3) Damages Directive. 
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– and so the absolute marginal benefit of disclosure is likely to be higher where the 
total value of the claim is higher».115 
In what concerns leniency-related documents, we need to add the list of considerations that is 
provided in Article 6(4) Damages Directive. According to this provision, national courts 
should consider (a) whether the request has been formulated by specifying the nature, matter 
or contents of the documents submitted (vs. a non-specific application), (b) whether the party 
requested disclosure is doing so in relation to an action for damages before a national court, 
and (c) the need to safeguard the effectiveness of the public enforcement of competition law.  
Taking the above, as well as the observations articulated in Chapter II, Sections 1 and 2, it is 
possible to understand that the leeway that is granted to national judges is not as wide as it 
could be expected. On the contrary, and although the lists of Articles 5(3) and 6(4) are non-
exhaustive, national judges have been given some criteria to be guided by and, apparently, 
may not decide a disclosure request on a completely arbitrary basis.  
Moreover, and in comparison to the principles enshrined in Regulation (EC) no. 1049/2001 – 
that is, the concern with the protection of commercial interests and the protection of 
investigations – the judges’ discretion has also been restricted insofar as the legislator has 
already undertaken the necessary balance and provided strict rules on the subject. Indeed, 
Article 5(5) of the Damages Directive starts by reiterating that «the interest of undertakings to 
avoid actions for damages following an infringement of competition law shall not constitute 
an interest that warrants protection». As for the other commercial interests that have been 
mentioned by CJEU in EnBW116, the issue of their disclosure was also tackled by the 
legislator when he provided, in Article 5(4) of the Directive, that the disclosure of confidential 
information (where business secrets and, hence, commercially sensitive information is 
included) is subject to the availability of effective measures to ensure its protection. 
Regarding the protection of investigations, we have already seen117 that the legislator has 
provided a solution on how long that protection is necessary, limiting it to the adoption of a 
decision or otherwise closing of the proceedings by the NCA. 
                                                          
115 WAGNER-VON PAPP, Florian, Chapter A: Article 5: Discretionary Disclosure as the Basic Rule, Section 
v.: Proportionality (op. cit., nt. 14). 
116 EnBW (op. cit., nt. 35). 
117 See Chapter II, Section 1. 
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Additionally, and from a different perspective, it can be argued that the principle of 
effectiveness, mentioned on Article 4 of the Damages Directive, and as applied in 
Laboratoires Boiron118, imposes an obligation on national courts to, pursuant to Article 5 
Damages Directive, order disclosure. This obligation would apply in all cases where 
claimants’ rights to damages for harm caused by an infringement of competition law would 
otherwise become impossible or excessively difficult to enforce. Yet, and in this regard, we 
must not forget that Article 9(1) Damages Directive finds an infringement of competition law 
found by final decisions of a NCA or by a review court to be «irrefutably established for the 
purposes of an action for damages brought before their national courts». This irrebuttable 
presumption reverts the burden of proof and puts the onus on the party that is more likely to 
have information: the infringer. In this regard, FLORIAN WAGNER-VON PAP119 argues that a 
change in the burden of proof influences the urgency of any need for disclosure, affecting the 
interest balancing exercise that determines whether disclosure must be ordered. This Author 
goes even further, arguing that shifting the burden of proof is a functional equivalent to 
disclosure. 
Notwithstanding, even if the breach of competition law is to be considered proven, there is 
still an evidential problem in quantifying the suffered damages and establishing the causal 
link between the infringement and the loss. For these purposes, the pre-existing information, 
such as minutes of meetings or other internal documents of the cartel, may prove useful. The 
question is then whether the refusal of access to these documents make it impossible or 
excessively difficult to enforce the right to compensation. (i.e. whether access to leniency 
material is crucial to support a civil damages’ claim). 
To answer this question, national courts must offset the need for access to leniency material 
with the possibility to obtain sufficient evidence from other sources. In what regards pre-
existing information, since they exist independently from the leniency application, it can be 
argued that cartel victims may seek access to them through the general rules of Article 5, 
asking the court to order disclosure from the leniency applicant himself and not from the 
NCA. Although the practical effect would be virtually the same, this solution seems to be 
more in line with the concern of maintaining the attractiveness of leniency programmes. 
Therefore, it could be considered that access to leniency documents included in the file of a 
                                                          
118 Case C-526/04, Laboratoires Boiron, 7 September 2006 [ECLI:EU:C:2006:528], para. 57. 
119 WAGNER-VON PAPP, Florian, Chapter VI: What Does the Future of Disclosure in the EU Look Like? (op. 
cit., nt. 14). 
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competition authority can only be granted where access to those same documents through 
other sources is not possible.   
Moreover, still with respect to the quantification of damages, it should be noted that Article 
17(1) Damages Directive imposes on Member States the obligation to ensure that national 
courts are empowered to estimate the amount of harm if it is established that a claimant 
suffered harm but it is practically impossible or excessively difficult to quantify precisely the 
harm suffered on the basis of the evidence available. Moreover, Article 17(2) establishes a 
rebuttable presumption that cartel infringements cause harm. 
The presumption that cartel infringements cause harm means that, unless that presumption is 
rebutted, it is established, for the purposes of Article 17(1), that the claimant suffered harm. 
Consequently, even if the refusal to disclose leniency documents renders it practically 
impossible or excessively difficult for the claimant to quantify the damages, it still does not 
make it impossible or excessively difficult for him to exercise his right to compensation, 
because national courts will be empowered to estimate damages on their own. To do so, and 
according to Article 17(3), national courts may request NCAs to assist them, where the NCA 
considers such assistance to be appropriate. The intention of this norm is to have experts assist 
the courts in in the determination of the quantum of damages. 
Other factors to take into consideration when carrying out the balancing test imposed by the 
Directive were laid out in National Grid120, a case involving a request of documents of the 
Commission for purposes of preparing a follow-on damage claim.  
Because of the uncertainties left by Pfleiderer, the national judge, HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE 
PETER ROTH, decided to adjourn the part of the application that related to leniency documents 
and invited the Commission to make an amicus curiae submission. The Commission provided 
two specific tasks to be carried out by the court: (i) to assess whether, in the circumstances of 
the case, disclosure of leniency documents would expose the leniency applicants to a greater 
liability than those parties that did not cooperate with the Commission121; (ii) to consider 
whether disclosure would be proportionate in light of its possible interference with the 
                                                          
120 EWHC 869 (Ch), Case No. HC08C03243 in the High Court of Justice Chancery Division, Royal Courts of 
Justice, National Grid, 04 April 2012. 
121 Observations of the European Commission, National Grid, para. 18 (op. cit., nt. 3,). 
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leniency programmes by considering if the document is at all relevant for the claim, and 
whether there are other available sources of evidence that are equally effective122.  
In Mr. Justice ROTH’s application of the proportionality test, he considered that disclosure 
would not increase the leniency applicant’s exposure to liability compared to the liability of 
parties who did not cooperate, because all parties to the cartel are equally liable for the 
wrongdoing123. This reasoning remains true since the Damages Directive considers that 
«where several undertakings infringe the competition rules jointly, as in the case of a cartel, 
it is appropriate to make provision for those co-infringers to be held jointly and severally 
liable for the entire harm caused by the infringement»124. Moreover, the immunity recipient 
is, in principle, relieved from joint and several liability for the entire harm, limiting his 
contribution to the harm caused to his own direct or indirect purchasers or his direct or 
indirect providers125. The liability of the immunity recipient is only extended in those cases 
where, in what regards other injured parties, full compensation cannot be obtained from the 
other undertakings126. As the case may be, the contribution of the immunity recipient should 
not exceed its relative responsibility for the harm caused by the cartel127.  
As for the second guidance given by the Commission, HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PETER 
ROTH agreed that «proportionality should be considered in terms of (a) whether the 
information is available from other sources, and (b) the relevance of the leniency materials to 
the issues in this case»128. 
However, and curiously, Article 6(4), intend c) Damages Directive, as seen above, provides 
that, when assessing the proportionality of an order to disclose information that is included in 
the file of an NCA, national courts shall consider «the need to safeguard the effectiveness of 
the public enforcement of competition law». Contrary to expectations, it seems that the 
legislator did not want to take a rigid position on what is the risk of disclosure of evidence 
included in the file of a competition authority and its consequences on the effectiveness of 
public enforcement. Conversely, the Directive gives what appears to be a blank cheque to 
                                                          
122 Idem, para. 21. 
123 National Grid, para. 35 (op. cit. nt. 120). 
124 Recital 37 Damages Directive. 
125 Article 11(4) intend a, Damages Directive. 
126 Article 11(4) intend b, Damages Directive. 
127 Article 11(5) Damages Directive. 
128  National Grid, para. 39 (op. cit. nt. 120). 
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national courts to, sustained by one general principle, refuse the request of disclosure and 
decide a systemic issue on a case-by-case basis. 
 
2. EU Fundamental Rights 
Without prejudice to the above, it is important to consider the different interests which should 
be weighed against each other when assessing the proportionality of an order to disclose 
information and examine which rights the opposing parties are entitled to. 
According to the Preamble of Regulation (EC) no. 1/2003, NCAs and national courts must 
enforce European competition law on their territories in accordance with EU fundamental 
rights, notably observing the principles recognised by the Charter. 
As for whether the Charter applies to purely national cartels, the CJEU has confirmed that it 
has jurisdiction where an EU Directive does not apply, but where the national legislature 
intended to treat purely internal situations in the same way as where the Directive would 
apply129. Since this is the case in some jurisdictions applying EU competition law130, it is of 
even greater importance to consider the rights which are enshrined in both the Charter and the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  
 
2.1.Right to an Effective Remedy and to a Fair Trial 
Article 47 of the Charter provides for the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal and the 
right to a fair trial to everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union 
are violated. The first part of Article 47 of the Charter – right to an effective remedy – 
corresponds to Article 13 ECHR, while the second paragraph – right to a fair trial – equates 
Article 6(1).  
The right to an effective remedy of cartel victims was specifically recognized in the already 
mentioned judgements Courage131 and Manfredi132. In particular, the CJEU considered that 
                                                          
129 Case C-482/10, Cicala, 21 December 2011 [ECLI:EU:C:2011:868], para. 19. 
130 See Chapter II, Section 3.2, above. 
131 Courage, para. 25-26 (op. cit., nt. 2). 
132 Manfredi, para. 60-63 (op. cit., nt. 8). 
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an effective remedy of cartel victims should entail the compensation «not only for actual loss 
(damnum emergens) but also for loss of profit (lucrum cessans) plus interest»133.  
The notion of fair trial, which should be considered together with the right of access to 
documents134, is granted to both cartel victims and infringers. In what regards injured parties, 
the AG MAZÁK has argued that a NCA should not, in the absence of an overriding legitimate 
reason of public or private necessity, deny an allegedly injured party access to documents in 
its possession which could be produced in evidence in order to assist the latter in establishing 
a civil claim against a member of a cartel, «as this could de facto interfere with and diminish 
that party’s fundamental right to an effective remedy».135 However, and recognising the 
tension between public and private enforcement, the AG considered that:  
«(…) the disclosure to civil litigants of the contents of voluntary self-incriminating 
statements made by leniency applicants, in the course of a leniency procedure and for 
the purpose of that procedure, in which the applicants effectively admit and describe 
to a competition authority their participation in an infringement of Article 101 TFEU, 
could substantially reduce the attractiveness and thus the effectiveness of a national 
competition authority’s leniency programme. This in turn could undermine the 
effective enforcement by the national competition authority of Article 101 TFEU and 
ultimately private litigants’ possibility of obtaining an effective remedy. Thus, while 
the denial of such access may create obstacles to or hinder to some extent an allegedly 
injured party’s fundamental right to an effective remedy, I consider that the 
interference with that right is justified by the legitimate aim of ensuring the effective 
enforcement of Article 101 TFEU by national competition authorities and indeed 
private interests in detecting and punishing cartels»136. 
On the other hand, the AG claimed to find no reason to refuse the disclosure of documents 
which were submitted with the leniency application, in order to assist in an action for 
damages.137 
 
                                                          
133 Idem, para. 95. 
134 See Chapter I, Section 1, above, and Article 42 Charter. 
135 Opinion of AG Mazák on Pleiferer, para. 38 (op. cit., nt. 59). 
136 Idem, para. 44. 
137 Idem, para. 47. 
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2.2.Right to Respect for Private Life 
Article 7 of the Charter provides that «everyone has the right to respect for his or her private 
and family life, home and communications», corresponding to Article 8 ECHR. The question 
is whether this right confers a confidential status to certain leniency material.  
The only reason why a leniency applicant confesses his participation in a cartel and provides 
evidences of the cartel’s activity, is to obtain fine immunity or its reduction. Thus, it is only 
natural to conclude that these self-incriminating and naturally confidential statements and 
documents are given under the expectation that they will not be generally disclosed to the 
public138. 
 
In any case, the weigh to be given to EU fundamental rights is merely subsidiary, as they 
appeal to general principles of Law that were already considered by the legislator when 
drafting the Damages Directive and the choices entailed therein. That said, we can expect that 
these and other fundamental rights will only be considered by national judges on a secondary 





                                                          
138
 Idem, para. 45 





The Damages Directive changed the paradigm of access to leniency documents in private 
litigation, aiming to bring to an end the inconsistency and uncertainty that characterized the 
disclosure of evidence in damages actions.  
This Directive, however, left to national courts the difficult task of conducting a 
proportionality test where they must weigh the interests of injured parties and those of 
leniency applicants. This is particularly challenging since these interests must, in turn, be 
balanced together with the recognized right to compensation and the public interest in 
maintaining leniency programmes as attractive and effective as possible. 
However, and simultaneously, while it is true that leniency statements are now 
unconditionally protected from disclosure, it should be noted that the mere introduction of an 
abstract proportionality test does not necessarily entail any changes in how the disclosure of 
other leniency documents (namely pre-existing information) takes place in the different 
Member States. Without more, the proportionality test, and opposite to what was intended, 
can be used by both liberal and conservative disclosure legal systems to maintain their 
traditions, simply by putting different emphasis on the opposing interests. This is even more 
evident where the Damages Directive expressly provides that national courts should, when 
assessing the proportionality of an order to disclose information included in the file of a 
competition authority, consider the need to safeguard the effectiveness of the public 
enforcement of competition law.  
As a result of the considerations above, the Damages Directive seems to fall short of its 
objectives, adopting a schizophrenic policy with regard to the disclosure of leniency-related 
evidence. While, on the one hand, the Directive seems to restrict the grounds of refusal of 
disclosure (limiting the margin of discretion that is allowed to national judges), it proceeds to 
grant a “get out of jail, free card”, by, through the invocation of a general public policy 
principle, blankly dethrone all the other rules and refuse to order disclosure. 
All this combined creates – or maintains – an environment of doubt on how national judges 
will apply the rules on disclosure of evidence that are provided in the Directive, especially its 
proportionality test. Hence, and although there is not enough experience in practice yet to 
allow us to anticipate the result – and, thus, the merit – of the Damages Directive, we believe 
that, at least until such practice is reached, leniency-applicants will be particularly careful and 
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adopt a preventive behaviour, when submitting their applications and choosing its 
accompanying documents. 
Weighting everything up, although the Damages Directive is intended to be seen as progress 
(and without denying that it does provide important standardization on the confidentiality of 
leniency statements and  that it contributes with some enlightenment on the rules to be 
followed by national judges), it is too early to say whether it will achieve its intended aims; 
only history will tell.   
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